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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20150750-CA

JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT,
Defendant/Appellant.

Appellant is incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(j). See Addendum A
(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment): R. 280-81.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission
of two unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications of defendant when the victim
was pistol whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his assailant.
Standard ofReview: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first

time on appeal presents a question oflaw, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness."
State v. Fowers, 2011 UT App 383, ,r15, 265 P.3d 832 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Furthermore, whether an eyewitness identification violates the right to due
process is a question of law that this Court will review for correctness. State v. Hubbard,
2002 UT 45, ,r 22, 48 P.3d 953. "[H]owever, because this question of law requires the

application of the record facts to the due process standard, [this Court will] incorporate a
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Id.
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but it need not be. See State v. Larsen,

2011 UT App 426, iJ3, 267 P.3d 969 (per curiam). Ineffective assistance of counsel is an
exception to the preservation rule. Id.
Issue II: Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of a hearsay statement by the co-defendants that implicated defendant in the
crime, in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine
his accusers.
Standard ofReview: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first

time on appeal presents a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] for correctness."
Fowers, 2011 UT App at iJ15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but it need not be. See Larsen, 2011 UT

App at iJ3. Ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to the preservation rule. Id.
Issue III: Whether, even if the instances of deficient performance identified in
Points I and II are not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal on their own, taken
together, they are cumulatively prejudicial.
Standard ofReview: A claim of cumulative prejudice "requires [the Court] to

apply the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of error." Radman v.
Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, iJ4, 172 P.3d 668.
Preservation: Inapplicable.
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Issue IV: Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence of these crimes was
two unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant, an improperly admitted
co-defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail telephone call.
Standard ofReview: "When a defendant challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency
of the evidence, '[this Court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Noor, 2012
UT App 187, ,I4, 283 P.3d 543 (mem.). This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict 'only
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."' Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's directed verdict motion
made at the close of the State's case. R.558. But to the extent this Court believes it is not,
it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, if3,
282 P.3d 1066 (per curiam). "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the
plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ifl 7, 10 P.3d 346).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following is attached hereto in Addendum B: Utah Code §76-6-203, Utah
Code §76-6-302, and U.S. Constitution Amend. VI.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Amended Information charged Justin Paul Craft ("Mr. Craft") with one count
of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code §76-6-302 and one count of aggravated
burglary in violation of Utah Code §76-6-203 as a result of an incident that occurred on
March 12, 2013. R.252-53. On October 24, 2013, a district court judge granted Mr.
Craft's motion to sever his case so that he would be tried separately from the codefendants. R.46-47,70-71. At the close of a two-day jury trial held on June 16-17, 2015,
Mr. Craft was convicted of both charges. R.242-243, 250-251, 257-58. On August 24,
2015, Mr. Craft was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of not less than ten years
to life for each count, with both counts to run concurrently to each other. R.278-81. Mr.
Craft timely appealed. R.282. Our supreme court transferred the case to this Court.
R.286-291.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

I.

Facts Relevant to the Incident in the Home.

On March 12, 2013, sometime after 11 :50 p.m., three men entered a bungalow
located on Westminster Avenue in Sugar House. R.394,398,416,424. Alexander Ray
Davis (Davis) and his mother, Kristin Ane Kirby (Kirby) were in the house. R.392. Davis
was asleep in his bedroom, located in the basement of the bungalow, and Kirby was
asleep in an upstairs bedroom. R.397,424. The house was pitch black. R.411,437.
Davis awoke to "two men punching [him] in the face ... with guns pointing at [his]
head." R.395. The men pulled Davis from his bed and onto the floor. R.395,398. Davis
was then pistol whipped. R.395,398,409. Because Davis was not fully awake when the
4

hitting started, he wasn't sure how many times he had been hit. R.398. Davis, however,
was awake during the time he was pistol whipped. R.409. The beating and the pistol
whipping made Davis's "whole face[] bloody." R.439.
The two men repeatedly asked Davis to tell them where they might find "the safe."
R.397-98. During this time, one of the men stood over Davis and pointed a gun at him
while the second man searched and "trashed" his room. R.398. In total, Davis was held in
his room "for about five to ten minutes" at gun point while his room was being searched.
R.398-99. Both men were wearing black "long sleeves and pants" and gloves. R.397-98.
They were also wearing ski masks. R.397-98, 411. While in Davis's bedroom, the two
men kept on their ski masks so that the "only part of [their] faces" that Davis could see
was "around [their] eyes". R.397-398. Based upon what Davis could see, he noticed that
one of the men had "darker skin, and [the other] one ... white." R.398,401. (Regarding the
presence of light in the bedroom, Davis testified at trial that "the lights were definitely
turned on[,]" but he did not see the men tum on the lights. R.411.).
The two men then took Davis to a living room area after searching his bedroom.
R.400. Davis was put in a "sacrificial position[,]" where he was ordered to stay on his
knees with his head down and his "hands over his head." R.400-01,412. At this point, a
man stood in front of Davis and held a gun to his head. R.401,413-14. The man holding
the gun was the same man who had pointed the gun at Davis while in the bedroom.
R.401. He was also the same man who had pistol whipped Davis. R.410,412. This man
was "darker skinned." R.401,410,412. The second man -- the one with "lighter skin[]"-searched the living area, including the closets and the bathrooms. R.400-01. The two men
5

continued to ask Davis questions about the whereabouts of a safe. R.401. Davis was in
the living area for "about five to ten minutes." R.404. While in the living room, Davis
saw one of the men- "the white one" -remove his mask. R.401,412. Davis "could still
look around" and saw the "white-skinned person" in his "peripheral vision". R.412-13,
415. The white-skinned person was never directly in front of Davis, and at times was
directly behind him. R.415.
During the time that these events were occurring, Kirby awoke to a flashlight
shining in her eyes. R.424-25. Kirby saw a man pointing a gun at her who was wearing a
mask and a jacket with "light reflecting sides." R.425. She was able to see only "the
shape of his head" and that he had "[b]lack, short hair, and a big, round face." R.425-26.
The man ordered Kirby not to look at him. R.425. Kirby "rolled up into a fetus position
and put [her] hands over [her] eyes." R.425. The man asked Kirby about jewelry and a
safe, then searched the nightstand and took Kirby's iPad and cell phone. R.425-27. He
was in Kirby's bedroom for less than ten minutes. R.427.
After searching her bedroom, the man walked Kirby downstairs to the living area.
R.428. To get there, Kirby had to walk through the kitchen, where the lights were turned
off. R.43 7. As Kirby and the man entered the living area, Kirby saw that the closet was
open, the closet light was on, "and there was movement in the closet." R 428,437-38.
According to Kirby, the closet light provided "enough light that the whole room was very
well visible to the eye." R.438.
At this point, Davis, who was still on his knees, saw a "shorter, heavier set" and
"dark-skinned male," wearing "all black, with a black ski mask," bring his mother down
6

the stairs into the living area. R.404-05. Davis noticed that the man was pointing a gun at
his mother's head. R.404. Kirby saw Davis "laying on the ground" and a man was
pointing a gun at him. R.428. The man walking with Kirby forced her into the "sacrificial
position" next to Davis. R.404. Kirby and Davis were both "face down on the carpet."
R.429. Two men held Kirby and Davis at gunpoint while the third man searched the
closet. R.429. The man who had brought Kirby into the living area told her "don't look
up at us, don't look up." R.429. Kirby never saw the third man, but "[j]ust heard him in
the closet." R.438-39. During this time, Kirby and Davis were looking at each other. R.
415. Davis told Kirby that he was sorry. R. 416. He did so because he felt bad that his
mother had been put in this situation and he believed that the situation had "something to
do with the drugs." R.416.
After about five minutes had passed, Kirby heard one of the men say, "we've been
here too long." R.429-30. Kirby and Davis "laid there" while one of the men "mov[ed]
stuff all over the closet." R.430. The men then "shut off all the lights," turned on their
flashlights, and pointed them at Davis and Kirby "blinding [them] with their lights."
R.405,412, 417. The three men started walking up the stairs. R.405. One man told Davis
and Kirby that the men knew where to find them. R.431. The men had their I.D.s -- "all
of [their] information," - so "if [they] ever tr[ied] to say anything, [the men] w[ould]
come find [them]." R.405,431. The men took with them items from the house, including
cellphones, Davis's wallet, an iPad, and a MacBook Air computer, a lap top, golf clubs,
and two sets of car keys (one of which was for Kirby's Mini Cooper). R.402,407,432433.
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After the men left, Kirby and Davis stayed on the floor for approximately one
minute. R.431. Once they got up, Kirby noticed that Davis was "bloody from head to
toe," and "his eyes ... had so much blood in them" that she "thought [the men] had done
something to his eyes." R.431,439. The beating left a "scar" on Davis's forehead. R.395.
After the men left, Kirby and Davis went to a neighbor's house to phone the
police. R.405,432. Officers arrived about five minutes later. R.406,444. K9 officers were
used to search the area, but they were unable to locate a track regarding any of the
suspects. R.406,444-45. When an officer learned that some of the stolen items were
electronic devices, he asked Davis if those devices could be tracked through a GPS
system. R.407,433,446. The iPad was tracked to a trailer park near Harrison Avenue,
between Main Street and West Temple. R.407-08,448,450-51. In addition, an officer
recovered two of the stolen cell phones and Davis's wallet just three streets north of
Davis and Kirby's residence. R.407-408,446-48,472-74. The cell phones were not tested
for fingerprints or DNA evidence. R.476.
Soon after arriving at the trailer park area, the officers observed two individuals
run in the direction of the trailers. R.482-83,488. The individuals appeared to be "tiny,
slender" and "male[]," but no other identifying features were distinguishable. R.489. The
officers yelled out commands for the individuals to stop, but they instead ran between
two trailers and "disappeared." R.483,485. In pursuing the individuals, the officers went
to trailer 14, set up a "containment on all sides," and waited there until other officers
arrived on the scene. R.486. Officers secured the door to trailer 14 and began ordering
people out of the trailer one-by-one. R.45 l ,486,491-92,555-556. Seven individuals were
8

in the trailer, including Mr. Craft. R.529-30,555-556,608,613,621. See also State's
Exhibits 37-41. Officers searched Mr. Craft and did not find any weapons. R.495. After
officers spoke with the individuals who had been in trailer 14, they transported Mr. Craft,
Jayvaughn Firethunder, and Desmond Redkettle to jail. R.532. Evidence found inside the
trailer was excluded at trial. R.135-143, 469.
A silver PT Cruiser belonging to Desmond Redkettle was parked next to trailer 14.
R.453,458,547,612. After getting a search warrant, Officer Tyler Lowe (Lowe) and
Officer Derek Coats (Coats) searched the vehicle. R.453, 458. Both officers observed a
bag of marijuana inside the vehicle. R.453,461. Lowe testified that the amount of
marijuana found "wasn't a small amount." R.453. A gun holster and a mask were found
inside the driver's door. R.459. In the trunk of the vehicle, officers found a Black
JanSport backpack and a G. Loomis bag. R.461-62. The JanSport backpack contained an
iPad, a flashlight, and a set of keys. R.461-62. 1 The G. Loomis bag contained "[s]everal
bags of marijuana," video games, and a jacket. R.462. Officers also found 9mm bullets in
the trunk of the car. R.462. The officers did not do a fingerprint or DNA testing of the
items found in the vehicle. R.465, 551. (But see R.547, where Torres testified that
fingerprints were taken, but that none of them came back as matching Mr. Craft. See also
R.548, where Torres stated that the guns inside the vehicle were tested for DNA, but the

The record does not indicate that the iPad found in the PT Cruiser is the one taken from
Davis and Kirby. See R.461. When testifying about the iPad found in the PT Cruiser,
Detective Coats stated that the iPad depicted in the photo marked as Exhibit 24 was the
"same I-pad" as the one depicted in the photo marked as State's Exhibit 25. R.461-62.
However, Detective Coats did not indicate that this was the same iPad that was taken
from Davis and Kirby. See R.461-62.
1
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results did not come back as matching Mr. Craft.). The keys found in the vehicle were
returned to "the owner." 462,464. 2

II.

Facts Relevant to the Witness Identifications of the Defendant.

Within a few hours after the incident, around 5 :00am or 6:00am, Davis went to the
hospital for treatment of his wound, which included getting ten stitches. R.410,418420,434-35. Davis was at the hospital for a little over an hour. R.410,421,435. Davis
testified at trial that while he was at the hospital, he saw police reports and photos of the
suspects on the news. R.410,418. Detective Reuben Torres (Torres) interviewed Davis
after he was released from the hospital. R.210,421,434-35, 531-32. At trial, there was a
discrepancy as to when this interview took place. Davis testified that his interview with
Davis took place "the next day or the day after" he went to the hospital. R.421. Kirby and
Torres testified the interview with Davis occurred at 9:00 a.m. on the day of the incident.
R.434-35,531. Torres testified that Mr. Craft was not formally arrested until 4:00 p.m.
that afternoon, after the interview and photo line-up with Davis had been completed.
R.533. Torres also testified that the police department does not release suspect photos to
the media until a formal arrest is completed. R.532-33. Torres did not know "how the
media got the pictures of the suspects," and that it "had to have been later on that day"

r,;

w

The "owner" of the keys was not identified by Detective Coats at trial. See R.462,464.
When testifying about the owner and the keys, Detective Coats stated that, "it's my
recollection ... I got [the keys] back to her." R.464. See also R.462 where Detective Coats
states, "A set of keys that I recovered out of that black-it was like a Jansport bag. And
then Detective Torres advised me who the owner was and how to get them back to that
person." R.462.
2

10

because he "wouldn't have released any information [to the press] as far as who [he] had
in custody." R.533.
At the interview, Torres presented Davis with a sequential photo lineup of six
photos. R.540. Torres showed the photos to Davis one at a time. R.418, 545-56. Mr.
Craft's photo was number five. R.545-46. Davis went through the photos "one or two
times," but was unable to identify the "darker skinned" individual that was in his room.
R.419. When Davis saw Mr. Craft's photo, he indicated that Mr. Craft "looked familiar."
R.546. Torres then asked Davis if the photo of Mr. Craft was the same man that stood
next to Davis' bed. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546. Davis did not provide a written
statement to police about the incident prior to the photo line-up. R.543. In the interview,
Davis told Torres that the man was white and that he had a goatee. R.544.
A trial was held on June 16, 2015. Davis testified that he had an immunity grant
with respect to the marijuana found in his garage. R.393,409. When asked about the
marijuana on direct examination, Davis testified that he only had "an eighth of
marijuana" for personal use. R.393 409,418. Davis denied being involved in the sale or
distribution of marijuana. R.394, 417,419. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked
Davis ifhe was "still sticking to [his] guns" that he had possessed only an eighth of an
ounce. R.409,417. Davis responded "yes." R. 409 However, a search of Davis' house
uncovered more than an eighth of an ounce of marijuana, as well as scales, pipes and
bongs-- all items "consistent with drug distribution." R.550, 549-550.
During the direct examination of Davis, the prosecutor asked him whether the
"white" man who took off his mask in the March 2013 incident was sitting in the
11

courtroom. R.401-402. Davis then identified Mr. Craft. R.402. Defense counsel did not
object to the in court identification of Mr. Craft. R.402. In addition, defense counsel did
not file a pre-trial motion to suppress the photo line-up identification of Craft that was
made by Davis in his pretrial interview with Torres.
At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a directed verdict
motion. R.558. The trial judge denied defense counsel's motion. R.558. In doing so, the
following exchange between defense counsel and the trial court took place:
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I'm just going to make the motion for a
directed verdict at this point, just on the basis that they haven't shown the
standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that
committed these crimes. And I'll submit it on that.
Trial Judge: All right. I'm going to deny it. I understand what you are
saying. There's -- the issue is whether or not the identification is proper, but
the --Mr. Davis testified and identified your client as the person being there.
That is enough to take it to the jury, to allow reasonable minds to consider
whether or not to find him guilty. So I'll deny the motion.
R.558. (emphasis added).
Defense counsel called only one witness, Dr. David Dodd ("Dodd"), a Doctor of
Psychology at the University of Utah, who was qualified at trial as an expert witness on
issues relating to eyewitness identification. R.183, 562. Dodd testified that research
studies show that for any person to "remember a face, we need to process it for a
significant amount of time." R.565,566. "[S]ometimes we can make an identification
within less than a minute, but as a rule it takes several minutes to get enough information
to later remember a face." R.566. Furthermore, "when people are highly stressed ...
mental processes don't work very well." R.566. In those situations where "people are
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confronted with a weapon, they are likely to spend a good part of their time looking at the
weapon and less of their time looking at the person ... [or] at the face." R.567. And, when
"there's more than one perpetrator[,] the division of attention to two people or more
diminishes the amount of time someone spends looking at one particular person." R.568.
Dodd testified that accurate memories about faces are better if one "writes things down ...
preferably [with]in minutes or, if necessary, half an hour or so" of seeing a face. R.568. If
this is not done, the mind "lose[s] [its] ability to remember details." R.568. Dodd
cautioned that "very subtle sorts of suggestion [that are made by others] can influence the
finite recall of memory." R.569.
Dodd testified that he had reviewed the photos that were in the photo spread given
to Davis, as well as the interview that took place between Torres and Davis. R.563. Dodd
noted that Davis was put in a stressful situation, with "a weapon pointed at his face for
the duration of the stressful event." R.567. Further, Davis did not provide any details
about "the age of the perpetrator" and that "[t]here was also a discussion of reddishbrown hair, which did not appear in[] any of the people in the photo spread." R.569. In
fact, the only suspect identification that was given by Davis that "was written down by an
officer ... [was] male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R. 572. Dodd
emphasized that Torres failed to follow some of the recommendations for how proper
eyewitness identification procedures should be carried out as described in the document,
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"[T]he National Institute of Justice, the US Department of Justice, the Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. " 3 R.570-71.
Torres failed to tell Davis "that the perpetrator may or may not be in the line-up."
R.571. Torres failed to tell Davis that "regardless of whether you pick anyone[,] we'll
continue to make an investigation of this case." R.571-72. Torres also failed to conduct
any "detailed interviews and detailed reports right after the crime took place." R.572.
R.572. Torres did not mention to Davis the importance of "clearing the innocent person
from suspicion." R.572. Torres also did not ask Davis about his "degree of certainty'' (i.e.
whether Davis was "90 percent certain or 30 percent certain") in picking out Mr. Craft's
photo. R.573. Knowing about certainty "right after the [photo] selection is made" is
important because, in general, "as soon as the witness is informed that they've picked the
right person, then their certainty goes up, and the closer they come to trial, the higher
their certainty gets." R.573. And while the police report indicated that Davis was
"confiden[t] ... about his ability to identify the white guy[,] .. .it was hard to say whether
that [type of confidence] makes a difference or not." R.577.
Although Torres used a sequential lineup, Dodd noted that "it would have been
preferable to do a double-blind procedure ... to avoid any appearance of bias." R.574.
576. In a double-blind procedure "the officer who's presenting the photos ... does not
know which person is the suspect." R.574. This double-blind procedure ensures that any
According to Dodd, this document, "published in 1999," was written by a committee
made up of "people in the legal system, judges and so on, ... police officers ... [and] a
few defense attorneys." R.570. This committee "made a number of recommendations
about how to conduct identification procedures that are strongly supported by the
research." R.570.
3
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identification that is made is not unfairly impacted by "subtle hints, unintended by the
police officer.' R.575. Lastly, Dodd emphasized that there were "hundreds of cases that
[have been] overturned" because of bad eyewitness identifications, where "the main
factor or the only factor in acquiring the conviction" was the eyewitness testimony.
R.575-79.
The trial judge gave the jury a "Long instruction," which listed "factors affect[ ing]
the accuracy of [eyewitness] identification." See Jury Instruction 20, attached as
Addendum C. See also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-95 (Utah 1986). R. 245,591,
581-82,584,590-592.

III.

Facts Relevant to the Improper Introduction of Co-Defendant's
Hearsay Statements at Trial.

In a pre-trial motion, defense counsel filed a motion to sever trial of co-defendants
pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). R.46. The motion pointed out
that severance was necessary "because the self-incriminating admissions of the codefendants [would] be used against each of them at trial, but said admissions cannot be
admitted as evidence in the trial of Mr. Craft." R.46. The trial court granted Mr. Craft's
motion and ordered that Mr. Craft's case be tried separately from the co-defendants.
R.70-71. 4 At trial, during a redirect examination of Detective Torres, the State asked
Torres to explain how he went about choosing which pictures to put in the photo line-up.
R.551-52. The following exchange took place between the State and Torres:

The co-defendants in the matter were listed as Jayvaughn Tyler Firethunder and
Desmond Lamar Redkettle. R. 70.

4
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Counsel for State: And the defense counsel mentioned hair, goatee and
white skin as the characteristics discussed with Alex during his description
before the lineup, correct?
Torres: Yes.
Counsel for State: Aside from those, are there any other factors other than
just the similarity to the defendant that guided you in selecting the lineup
photographs?
Torres: As far as the other two defendants saying he was there.
Counsel for State: No. Let me --- the --- when you were picking the
photographs out --Torres: Oh.
Counsel for State: --- was there any other information --- you said that Alex
mentioned his hair, the goatee and the fact that he was whiteTorres: Light skinned.
R.551-52 (emphasis added).
Defense counsel failed to object to the admission of the co-defendant statement
and failed to move for a mistrial when the statement was uttered. R. 551-52.
IV.

Facts Relevant to the Phone Call from Jail.

At trial, Torres testified about a phone call that was made from the jail. R.533-58.
Torres noted that the phone call was made on March 17, 2013, and that it was between a
man whom Torres identified as Mr. Craft, and an unknown woman. R.536-537. Torres
testified that during the phone call, the female gave the male "a hard time" and said "you
messed up, what were you thinking?" R.537. Torres testified that the male responded by
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saying "I'm probably going to do a nickel." 5 R.538. A portion of this call was admitted
into evidence as States' Ex. 23 and played for the jury. R.538. The forty second excerpt
of the phone call that was played for the jury contained the following exchange between a
man and a woman:

6

Male voice: [inaudible]
Female voice: "What up nigger? What are you doing, stupid
motherfucker?"
Male voice: [inaudible]
Female voice: "You're so fucking stupid! I'm gonna fuck you up man. I'm
[inaudible] fucking mad at you."
Male voice: "I wish I had called them too. And I was just. .. [voices talking
over each other]."
Female voice: "What the fuck were you thinking, man?!"
Male voice: "[inaudible] It. .. it wasn't supposed to [inaudible] like that,
man."
Female voice: "Stupid. Really, man."
Male voice: "Oh you don't even know how fucking mad I am. He got-"
Female voice: "[interrupting] I bet."
Male voice: "He got away."

s This portion of the call was not included in State's Ex. 23, thus the jury did not hear this

part of the phone call when the phone call was played for the jury. See States' Ex. 23. See
also R.535.
6 A recording of the jail phone call was admitted into evidence and made part of the
appellate record, but a transcript of the interview was not. See State's Ex. 23. For the
convenience of the Court, appellate counsel has prepared uncertified transcriptions of the
portions of the interview that are important to the issues Mr. Craft raises on appeal and
has made those transcriptions part of this brief.
17

Female voice: "Oh you know I'll have your back and I'll-I'll be taking
pictures of the baby and all that shit."
Male voice: "[inaudible]."
Female voice: "It's your board hearing, we'll go."
Male voice: "We'll go."
Female voice: "Dude, that's fucked up though man. I fucking feel for you.
I'm so mad at you."
Male voice: "I guess my homeboys -- my homeboys are a little crazy man.
Fucking I told 'em to leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing
like that.' 'Leave it."'
State's Ex. 23.
Torres identified the male speaker on the call as Mr. Craft based on, among other
things, the information that was recorded along with the phone call. R.537. When a phone
call is made from jail, a computer stores information related to the phone call including
the caller's "inmate number, name ... and the date and time" of the phone call. R.534.
Additionally, in order to make an outgoing phone call, inmates "have to identify
themselves." R.536. The phone call was listed under Mr. Craft's inmate number, the
computer information was consistent with that list, and Mr. Craft identified himself on
the recording. R.537. On cross-examination, Torres testified that on "one of Justin Craft's
[phone calls], he actually called somebody, and then he allowed somebody else to speak
to that person." R.539. Torres testified that he was aware of situations where other
inmates use another inmate's code. R.539. Torres testified that he "reviewed an hour and
a half of [Craft's] phone calls, and that person that was talking on this phone call was
pretty much the same one as [heard in] the other ... phone conversations." R.539.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to the
admission of the two unreliable and suggestive witness identifications made of Mr. Craft
by Davis (a pretrial out of court photo identification and an in-court identification). The
admission of the unreliable eyewitness identifications violated defendant's due process
rights under Utah's Constitution. In addition, defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to object to the improper admission of an incriminating
hearsay statement made by the co-defendants that placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene.
This deficient performance resulted in depriving defendant of his Sixth Amendment right
to confront his accuser. And, even if the two aforementioned instances of deficient
performance are not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal on their own, when taken
together, they are cumulatively prejudicial. Lastly, there was insufficient evidence to
convict Mr. Craft of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence
of these crimes was two unreliable eyewitness identifications of Mr. Craft, an improperly
admitted co-defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call.
ARGUMENT

I.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of two
unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant when the victim was
pistol whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his
assailant.

Two unreliable and unconstitutionally suggestive eyewitness identifications were
improperly introduced as evidence in this matter without being objected to by defense
counsel. This was ineffective assistance. "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,"
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Mr. Craft "must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel's performance was prejudicial in
that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Miller, 2012 UT App 172,
,19, 281 P.3d 282. In addition, defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that under
the circumstances, the challenged action [or omission] might be considered sound
trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,119, 12 P.3d 92 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the pre-trial, out of court,
photo identification of Mr. Craft that was made by Davis in his interview with Torres.
Counsel also performed deficiently in failing to object to the in court identification of Mr.
Craft made by Davis at trial. Furthermore counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr.
Craft.

A. Defense Counsel Performed Deficiently by Failing to Object to the Eyewitness
Identifications.
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court outlined a test to be applied for a
proper admissibility of eyewitness identifications. 817 P .2d 77 4, 781 (Utah 1991 ). The
Ramirez court held that the state due process clause of Utah's Constitution requires "an
in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability" because only reliable identifications
pass constitutional muster. Id. at 780. See also Utah Const. art I, § 7. Furthermore, "the
resulting reliability determination [under Utah's Constitution] will meet or exceed in
rigor the federal standard." Id. "The ultimate question to be determined is whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, [an] identification [is] reliable." Id. at 781. To
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determine reliability, an eyewitness identification must be analyzed according to a list of
"pertinent factors" as originally outlined in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,488 (Utah 1986).
These factors are:
(I) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event;
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it
was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember
and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the
event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it
was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the
observer's.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (brackets omitted) (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 7

The list is "not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered." State v.
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,127, 48 P.3d 953. These factors take into account "'the

deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory process
of an honest eyewitness."' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 490).
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "pertinent factors" in analyzing
whether the eyewitness identification in that matter was reliable, admissible, and
consistent with state due process guarantees. 817 P .2d at 781. In that case, two armed
7 The

federal standard outlined in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), is
similar, but also includes the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness and the
length of time between the crime and the confrontation. The federal standard is not the
focus of this argument because the Utah standard is both more rigorous and better suited
to the facts in this case. However, because the criteria are similar and the due process
analysis under the Utah Constitution is "as stringent as, if not more stringent than, the
federal analysis," a violation under the Utah Constitution would also be a violation of
federal due process. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
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robbers confronted three victims, stole from them, and fled. Id. at 776. Shortly afteiward,
while it was still dark, the police conducted a show-up procedure. Id. "It was
approximately one o'clock in the morning. Ramirez, a dark-complexioned Apache
Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the only suspect present and was
surrounded by police officers. The police turned the headlights and spotlights from the
police cars on Ramirez to provide enough light. The witnesses viewed Ramirez by
looking at him from the back seat of a police car." Id. at 777. One of the witnesses
identified Ramirez. Id. The "defense moved to suppress the out-of-court and in-court
identifications" because "the initial identification procedure gave rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification," which tainted subsequent identifications. Id.
The admissibility of the eyewitness identifications in Ramirez was "an extremely close
case," but the court ultimately found the show-up procedure admissible. Id. at 784.
This Court recently applied the Ramirez factors in State v. Lujan in determining
that the trial court erred in admitting unreliable eyewitness identifications. 2015 UT App
199, iJ 19, 357 P.3d 20, 25 cert. granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015). In Lujan, the witness
"came face-to face" with a man who was trying to rob him while he sat in his car in his
driveway. Id. at if 2. The witness became instantly afraid once he noticed that the man
had either a gun or a knife. Id. at iJ 3. The witness identified the robber as "Spanish" and
that he "had black and white longish hair, which was straight and poked out of the beanie
to mid-ear length." Id. at iJ 2 (internal quotations omitted). The witness later identified the
defendant at a show-up that occurred soon after the robbery and identified him again at
the preliminary hearing. Id. at iJ iJ5,8. By contrast, at a post-arrest line-up, the eyewitness
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was unable to identify anyone as being the robber, but he did note that the defendant and
another man "looked familiar" to him. Id. at ,I 7. In applying the Ramirez factors, this
Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the show-up and in-court
identifications because the eyewitness description of the robber did not match defendant.

Id. at ,r if 13, 14. In addition, the witness failed to identify the defendant at the line-up and
the race of the eyewitness was different than the race of the defendant. Id. at ,r if 13, 14.
Consideration of all the Ramirez factors and the totality of the circumstances in
Mr. Craft's case leads to the conclusion that the two eyewitness identifications made by
Davis were legally insufficient to "warrant a preliminary finding of reliability and,
therefore, admissibility." See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Furthermore, because the
application of the Ramirez factors indicates that the two eyewitness identifications were
so unreliable that they should have been excluded as evidence at trial, defense counsel
committed prejudicial error in not objecting to the improper admission of both
identifications on the ground that they violated Mr. Craft's due process rights under Utah
Const. art I, § 7.

1. The Opportunity of the Witness to View the Actor During the Event
The first reliability factor analyzes the witness's opportunity to view the actor.
"Pertinent circumstances include the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the
distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view the actor's
face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were distracting noises or activity during the
observation; and any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe
the actor." Ramirez, at 782. In Mr. Craft's case, the eyewitness, Davis, had an extremely
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short period of time to view the robbers, who were strangers to him. R.406. Davis
testified that he first saw two of the robbers during the "five to ten minutes" that he was
held at gunpoint in his bedroom. R.398. Davis's ability to see the robbers was drastically
hindered because even though the lights were on, the men were wearing ski masks that
obscured their faces. R.397-398, 411. Davis was initially only able to see the "part of
[their] faces" "around [their] eyes." R.397-398. Davis could only see that one of the men
had "white" skin. R.398, 401.
During the "five to ten minutes" when Davis was in the living area, he saw one of
the men remove his mask. R.401,412. However, Davis's opportunity to view this man
was limited because Davis was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial position[,]" so he
was only able to view the man without the mask in his "peripheral vision." R.400-01,41215. This man was never directly in front of Davis, and at times was directly behind him.
R.415. The living area was lit by the ambient light coming from a storage closet, while
the rest of the house was "pitch black." R.411-13,437-38. During this entire time, Davis
was held at gunpoint. R.400-01. As the robbers were leaving, they "shut off all the lights"
and used their flashlights to "blind[] [Davis] with their lights" so that they could not be
seen. R.405,412,417. Thus, Davis never had an opportunity to directly view the robbers
in his house, without obstruction, for a lengthy period of time, and with good lighting. Cf.

Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 at ,r 24 (Pearce, J. dissenting) (the witness observed the robber
"face to face" for several seconds" when the "[d]efendant's face was uncovered.").
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2. The Witness's Degree of Attention to the Actor at the Time of the Event
Other circumstances affecting the witness's ability to observe and remember a
participant in a crime includes whether the degree of attention to an actor is distracted by
a second actor or other object (i.e. a weapon). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (stating "the
[witness] testified at trial that he stared at the gunman, trying to get a good description,
and that he did not see the pipe man as clearly as he saw the gunman.") See also Lujan,
2015 UT App 199, at if 3 (where the witness became instantly afraid once he noticed that
the man had either a gun or a knife.).
Expert witness Dr. Dodd testified that "the more time someone spends looking at
the weapon, the less time they spend looking at the face," which "disrupt[s] later facial
recognition." R.567. Here, Davis was held at gunpoint for a significant amount of time
throughout the entire incident. R.398-99, 401, 413-14, 429. In addition, Davis was
initially distracted by being hit and pistol whipped, leaving his "whole face [] bloody."
R.395,398,400-01,412-14. Davis's attention was also distracted by the fact that there
were three, not just one, uninvited men in his house. R.429. He was also distracted by his
concern for his mother once she entered the room and he became focused on her in order
to apologize to her. R.401,404,415-416. Thus, a number of distractions vied for Davis's
attention while the robbers were in his house.

3. The Witness's Capacity to Observe the Event, Including His Physical and
Mental Acuity
The third factor is the witness's capacity to observe the event. "Here, relevant
circumstances include whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress
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or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by
uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez. at 783.
"Contrary to much accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of
stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly." Long, 721 P.2d at 489.
Here, Davis was sound asleep and awoken to "two men punching [him] in the
face" who dragged him from his bed and pistol whipped him. R. 395, 398, 409. Dodd
testified that Davis "must have been quite frightened" and that Davis was under a level of
stress "at a point where it disrupts [one's] mental processes." R.567. After the men left,
Davis's mother noticed he was "bloody from head to toe" and "his eyes ... had so much
blood in them" that she thought the men "had done something to his eyes." R.431,439.
Thus, Davis's capacity to observe the event was limited not only by his heightened level
of stress, but also by the extreme pain he would have experienced from the wound on his
forehead that covered his face and eyes in blood. R.395,431,439,567.
4. Whether the Witness's Identification Was Made Spontaneously and
Remained Consistent Thereafter, or Whether It Was the Product of
Suggestion
Relevant considerations under this reliability factor include the length of time
between the incident and the identification, "instances when the witness or other
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other
eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. A show-up is most reliable when the eyewitness was already
familiar with the suspect. E.g., State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1984). The
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eyewitness is this case, Davis, however, had never seen the man who robbed him before
/Al

\!JV

and did not know Mr. Craft. R.406.
In addition, the length of time between the incident and the initial identification of
Mr. Craft underscores the unreliability of the identification. The exact time between the
incident and the initial photo identification was disputed, as Davis testified he completed
the initial photo identification "the next day or the day after" the incident, while Kirby
and Torres testified the photo identification occurred at around 9:00 a.m. the day of the
incident. R.421,434-35,531. Torres further testified that between seven and eight hours
had passed between the incident and the initial photo identification. R.544. Under either
Davis's or Torres's timeline, there was a significant amount of time that elapsed between
the robbery and the photo line-up. That is, unlike in Ramirez, where the time between the
incident and the identification was described as "minimal" - between "thirty minutes to
an hour" - here the significant lapse of time between the incident and the initial
identification was from as little as seven up to 48 hours. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783;
R.421,434-35,531,544.
Furthermore, the eyewitness's description of the observed perpetrator in this case
was not immediately recorded, was not detailed, and it did not accurately identify Mr.
Craft. R. 543,569. That is, Davis did not provide a written statement to police about the
incident prior to the photo line-up. R.543. When Davis did provide police officers a
description of the robber who took off his mask; Davis described him as being "male,
white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R.572, 544. Dodd, however, noted that the
reddish-brown hair "didn't appear in ... any of the people in the photo spread." R.569.
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Thus, like in Lujan, the discrepancies between the initial description and Mr. Craft weigh
in favor of excluding the photo identification in this matter. See Lujan, 2015 UT App
199, ,r ,rB-14.
In addition, Davis's identification of Mr. Craft was the product of suggestion. That
is, Davis testified that he saw the photos of the suspects on the news prior to making any
identifications of Mr. Craft. R.210,421,434-35,531-32. Thus, Davis's own testimony
highlights the fact that his identifications were the product of improper suggestion by the
news reports that he saw prior to identifying Mr. Craft. In addition, the procedures
implemented by Torres in the photo identification reveals that Davis's identification of
Mr. Craft was the product of suggestion. Specifically, after Davis indicated that the photo
of Mr. Craft "looked familiar," Torres asked Davis if the man in the photo was the same
man that stood next to Davis's bed. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546. Davis,
however, testified that when the men were in his bedroom, both of them were wearing
masks, so he would not have been able to see the facial features of the man who stood
next to his bed. R.397-98,411. Furthermore, Torres' question to Davis is even more
egregiously suggestive than Dr. Dodd's example of a police officer's "subtle hint" to a
witness to "[l]ook at this [photo] carefully." R.575. Davis only said that Mr. Craft looked
familiar, he said nothing about Mr. Craft being one of the men involved in the robbery.
R.546. And, although Dr. Dodd described the photo identification was "so far as I
know ... objectively done," Dodd testified that a "double-blind procedure" is preferable
and was not done in this matter. R.576. Ultimately, the lack of a ''double-blind" photo
identification opened up the possibility that Davis was influenced by "subtle hints,
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unintended by the police officer." R.575. Further, Torres did not ask Davis about his
"degree of certainty" after the identification. R.573. Torres also failed to tell Davis that
the police would continue to investigate "regardless of whether [Davis] pick[ed] anyone."
R.571-72. Thus, there are a number of factors surrounding the photo identification that
indicate the unreliability of Davis's eyewitness testimony against Mr. Craft.

5. The Nature of the Event Being Observed and the Likelihood that the
Witness Would Perceive, Remember and Relate It Correctly
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]his last area includes such factors as
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." State v.

Long, 721 P.2d 483,493 (Utah 1986). As explained above, the stressful nature of the
event diminishes the likelihood that the witness was able to perceive and remember the
robber.
Even when the facts surrounding the identification are viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the eyewitness
identification from the show-up was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The
eyewitness provided a very brief and inaccurate description of a man he saw during a
highly stressful robbery and burglary, with multiple distractions, and for a brief period of
time.
An application of the five Ramirez factors shows that the out of court, pre-trial
photo identification was improperly admitted at trial. In addition, the in-court
identification was tainted both by the earlier photo identification and by the suggestive
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circumstances of a courtroom identification. See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657
("unnecessarily suggestive" identification procedures give rise to "the possibility of
irreparable misidentification"). Mr. Craft was the only defendant sitting at counsel table
and the only realistic choice. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, iJ8.
The circumstances of this case indicate that both eyewitness identifications were
suggestive and unreliable and therefore violated Utah's due process clause. Defense
counsel failed to object to the introduction of both of Davis's identifications of Craft and
erred in not doing so as demonstrated by the application of the Ramirez factors in this
matter. In addition, there was no strategic reason for defense counsel to not object to the
admission of the eyewitness identifications. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, iJ19.
That is, eyewitness identifications substantially impact and persuade a jury verdict so
there would be no strategic reason to allow the jury to hear evidence of unreliable
identifications that implicated Mr. Craft in the crime. See Lujan, at ,Il 9.

B. Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Prejudicial.
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Craft. The harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard applies to an eyewitness identification that is admitted in
violation of Utah's due process clause. See State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, iJ16, 357
P.3d 20, cert granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015). ("[T]he State bears the burden of
convincing us that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."). Additionally, even under the test used for nonconstitutional errors for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the introduction of the
unreliable witness identifications prejudiced Mr. Craft in this case. In order to establish
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prejudice for a non-constitutional error regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr.
Craft must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [deficient
performance], the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Eyre,
2008 UT 16, if 17, 179 P.3d 792 (internal quotation marks omitted). "This 'reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Id.
Here, the State's case relied heavily on the problematic eyewitness identifications.
That is, apart from the two eyewitness identifications, there was a dearth of evidence to
support that Mr. Craft was one of the three men involved in the robbery and burglary at
Davis and Kirby's residence on March 12, 2013. R.394. Neither Mr. Craft's fingerprints
nor DNA were found on any of the recovered stolen items. R.547-548. The vehicle that
was searched next to trailer 14 did not belong to Craft. R.453,458,547,612. In addition,
the ambiguous phone call made from the jail did not contain any incriminating statements
and did not place Mr. Craft at Davis and Kirby's residence at the March 2013 incident.
The eyewitness identification was therefore the State's strongest evidence in this case.

See Lujan, 2015 UT App, ,I19 ("When the eyewitness testimony is taken away, the State
loses its strongest evidence against Defendant, and we cannot say that the ... error in
admitting the unreliable eyewitness identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."). Thus, had the problematic identifications been objected to and excluded from
trial, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft.
For the foregoing reasons, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of the two unreliable eyewitness identifications in this matter. Furthermore,
there is no strategic reason that can be inferred from trial counsel's failure to object to the
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two eyewitness identifications. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if 19. Therefore, this Court
should reverse Mr. Craft's convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary
and remand for a new trial.
II.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of a
hearsay statement by the co-defendants that implicated defendant in the
crime, in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and
cross examine his accusers.

Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to sever trial of co-defendants pursuant
to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). R.46. The motion said that severance
was required "because the self-incriminating admissions of the co-defendants [would] be
used against each of them at trial, but said admissions [could not] be admitted as evidence
in the trial of Mr. Craft." R.46. The trial court granted Mr. Craft's motion and ordered
that Mr. Craft's case be tried separately from the co-defendants. R.70-71.
At trial, the State did not call either of the co-defendants, Jayvaughn Tyler
Firethunder and Desmond Lamar Redkettle, as witnesses in its case. R.70. Nevertheless,
an incriminating hearsay statement made against Mr. Craft by the co-defendants was
improperly introduced at trial by a State's witness, Detective Torres. During a redirect
examination of Torres, the State asked him to explain how he went about choosing which
pictures to put in the photo line-up. R.551-52. The following exchange took place
between the State and Torres:
Counsel for State: And the defense counsel mentioned hair, goatee and white
skin as the characteristics discussed with Alex during his description before the
lineup, correct?
Torres: Yes.
32

Counsel for State: Aside from those, are there any other factors other than just
the similarity to the defendant that guided you in selecting the lineup
photographs?
Torres: As far as the other two defendants saying he was there.
Counsel for State: No. Let me --- the --- when you were picking the
photographs out --Torres: Oh.
Counsel for State: --- was there any other information --- you said that Alex
mentioned his hair, the goatee and the fact that he was white Torres: Light skinned.
R.551-52 (emphasis added).
Defense Counsel failed to object to the introduction of the improper hearsay
evidence in this case and failed to move for a mistrial. R.551-52. Defense Counsel's
failure to adequately respond to the improper hearsay testimony constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel because of the prejudicial impact of the hearsay statement. To
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for this issue, Mr. Craft "must show
that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) counsel's performance was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." State v. Miller, 2012 UT App 172, ,I9, 281 P.3d 282.
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A. Defense Counsel Performed Deficiently by Failing to Object to the
Introduction of the Incriminating Co-defendant Hearsay Statement.
The Confrontation Clause provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
Constitution, Amend. VI. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). A
defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers when a
nontestifying co-defendant hearsay statement is introduced at trial that implicates
defendant in the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132. The incriminating statements of a codefendant are not only "devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably
suspect." Id. at 136. Furthermore, "the unreliability of such evidence is intolerably
compounded when the alleged accomplice ... does not testify and cannot be tested by
cross-examination" Id.
Here, Torres improperly informed the jury that the co-defendants placed Mr. Craft
at the crime scene. The co-defendants' statement constituted testimonial hearsay because
it was an out-of-court statement that was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Utah
R. Evid. 801(c)(2); see also State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993). In addition, it

was testimonial hearsay because the statement had a "primary purpose of establishing or
proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." See State v.
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,r 34, 302 P.3d 844. Testimonial hearsay is only admissible in
a criminal case when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant previously had an
opportunity for cross examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Here, because defendant
never had an opportunity to cross examine the incriminating statement, it should not have
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been introduced at trial. Its admission, therefore, violated both the Confrontation Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and the hearsay rules. Id. See also Utah R. Evid. 802.
Furthermore, trial counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to the hearsay
statement that implicated defendant in the crime and by not moving for a mistrial once
the statement was uttered. In determining whether trial counsel's failure falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness, it is appropriate for this Court to determine whether
a legitimate trial strategy existed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90
(1984). The presumption that counsel's performance was part of a sound trial strategy
may be overcome when "there is a lack of conceivable tactical basis for counsel's
actions." State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ,r14, 283 P.3d 980 (internal quotes omitted).
Here, there was no strategic trial reason to not object to the hearsay statement and to not
ask for a mistrial as it was inherently unreliable and implicated Mr. Craft in the crime.
This statement was "improper and inflammatory" in nature and had no conceivable
beneficial value to the defendant. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 26, 321 P.3d 1136.
Thus, because the co-defendant hearsay statement was both improper and inflammatory,
defense counsel's failures to object to the statement and move for a mistrial were
objectively deficient.
B. Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Prejudicial

Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Craft. A defendant "is prejudiced
by counsel's actions only if the result of the proceedings would have been different
absent the claimed deficiency." State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ,r 9, 165 P.3d 1185. "To
show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the defendant bears the
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burden of proving that counsel's errors 'actually had an adverse effect on the defense' and
that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ... errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."' State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, iJ 20, 167
P.3d 1038 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). "'A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Taylor v. State, 2007
UT 12, iJ 56, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Strickland, at 694).
However, here the deficient performance deprived Mr. Craft of his constitutional
right to confront his accusers. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Because the deficient
performance '"result[ed] in the deprivation of a constitutional right, [this Court] [should]
apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless [it] find[s] the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, iJl 7, 320 P.3d
677. Regardless, the error prejudiced Mr. Craft under either standard.
Here, there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the codefendant's inadmissible hearsay statement Mr. Craft would have not been convicted.
Other than the improper, inflammatory, and unreliable hearsay statement, there was no
reliable evidence that placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene. See infra, Part N. The only
other evidence in this case against Mr. Craft was unreliable eyewitness testimony and an
ambiguous phone call, neither of which placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene beyond all
reasonable doubt. See supra, Part IA; see also infra, Part IV. It is therefore likely that the
jury improperly relied on the improper co-defendant hearsay statement to find that Mr.
Craft was present at the crime scene. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the jury
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would have acquitted Mr. Craft if the improper co-defendant statement had not been
introduced at trial.

III.

Even if the Instances of Deficient Performance Identified in Points I and II
Are Not Sufficiently Prejudicial, Taken Together They Are Cumulatively
Prejudicial.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, this Court will reverse if the cumulative

effect of the several instances of deficient performance undermines the Court's
confidence that a fair trial was had. State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ,I61, 309 P.3d
1160. In other words, the Court will reverse if there is a '"reasonable probability"' of a
different outcome had none of the instances of deficient performance occurred. Id. at ,I24.
Even if the two instances of deficient performance identified in Points I and II are
not individually prejudicial, they are cumulatively prejudicial. Point I showed that
counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the introduction of two unreliable
witness identifications of Mr. Craft. See supra Point I. The absence of this deficient
performance increases the probability that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. See supra Point I.
Point II showed that counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the
introduction of improper co-defendant hearsay statements that incriminated Mr. Craft.
See supra Point II. The absence of this deficient performance increases the probability

that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft of aggravated robbery and aggravated
burglary. See supra Point II.
And without either of the instances of deficient performance shown in Points I and
II, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Therefore, under the
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cumulative prejudice doctrine, this Court should reverse Mr. Craft's convictions for
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and remand for a new trial.
IV.

The evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Craft's convictions for
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence of
these crimes were two unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant,
an improperly admitted co-defendant hearsay statement, and an
ambiguous jail phone call.
This Court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence when, viewing

"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict ... the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il5, 63 P.3d 94. "A
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. at ,r18 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). The Court "cannot take a speculative leap across a remaining
[evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict." Id.; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT
App 228, ,r7, 238 P.3d 1096 (stating that a jury verdict must be based on reasonable
inferences and not just "speculation and conjecture."). "Every element of the crime
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). "If the evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must
fail." Id.
A person commits first degree aggravated robbery "if in the course of committing
robbery, he (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
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601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or (c) takes or attempts to take an
operable motor vehicle." Utah Code §76-6-302, R.252.
In State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that
there was sufficient evident to convict the defendant of aggravated robbery. There, two
eyewitnesses identified the defendant as being the man who entered a 7-Eleven
convenience store to rob a store clerk at gun point. Id. at 40. Both eyewitnesses described
the man has "wearing a dark cowboy hat and a leather jacket." Id. at 40. Defendant's
brother eventually confirmed that the unique articles identified by the eyewitnesses
belonged to the defendant. Id. at 40. The defendant argued that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt for aggravated robbery because of the
discrepancies that existed between defendant's characteristics and the descriptions given
by the eyewitnesses, and that one of the eyewitnesses could not identify him at the
preliminary hearing as being the robber. Nevertheless, the Watson court held that the
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict because the eyewitness identified the
defendant at "a photo array shortly after the incident. .. [and] identified the defendant at
trial. When this evidence is combined with the evidence previously outlined which favors
the jury's verdict, it is clear ... [that] the jury verdict is amply supported." Id. at 41
(emphasis added). Thus, the Watson court pointed to additional evidence other than the
photo array and in court identification (i.e. the unique clothing articles that tied the
defendant to the crime) in denying the defendant's insufficiency claim. See also State v.
DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246,247 (Utah 1985) (the Utah Supreme Court held that there was

sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where in
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addition to the eyewitness testimony, defendant's palm print and thumb print were found
at the scene of the robbery.).
By contrast, in United States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209 (4 th Cir. 2011), the court
held that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for
interference with commerce through robbery. In Bonner, two men robbed a North
Carolina fast food restaurant. Id. at 211. During the incident, the two men were armed
and were wearing baseball hats, hoodies, and pantyhose over their faces. Id. A victim
inside the store could only identify the men as being "African-American male" Id. After
the robbers left, police stopped an SUV that matched the description of a vehicle that had
been seen at the restaurant. Id. at 212. Inside the vehicle were the defendant's wallet,
three cellphones, marijuana, and ammunition. Id. at 212. The cell phone records showed
that five calls were made in fast succession around the same time that the robbers left the
restaurant. Id. at 212. After reviewing video footage of the crime, police officers found a
baseball hat near the restaurant that matched a hat worn by one of the robbers. Id. At trial,
a DNA analysis pointed out that DNA found in the hat was consistent with the
defendant's DNA. Id.
In U.S. v. Bonner, the defendant argued that all of the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction of the robbery charge because "neither the presence
of his wallet (which contained his driver's license) in the SUV nor the New York
Yankees baseball hat with his DNA [were] sufficient to identify him as having been
present at the scene of the robbery." 735 F.Supp.2d 405, 410 (M.D.N.C 2010) aff'd .648
F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2011). In addition, the defendant pointed out that the phone calls made
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from the cell phones found in the vehicle had "innocent and useful purposes" and had
nothing to do with criminal activity. Id. at 410. The defendant pointed out that the
prosecution impermissibly "stack[ed] inference upon inference in its effort to identify
him as one of the robbers." Id. at 410.
The Bonner court agreed with the defendant that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions. In doing so, the court held that "the DNA
demonstrates that a hat previously worn- perhaps predominately- by [the defendant] was
present, not that [defendant] was the person wearing it during the robbery." Id. at 411. In
addition, "no eyewitness identified the robber the [prosecution] claims was [defendant] in
any respect, by facial feature, height, or any other feature, other than that he was AfricanAmerican male." Id. at 411. The court also noted that the phone call evidence did not
"demonstrate that [defendant] was present at the time of the robbery." Id. at 412. The
court held that while circumstantial evidence can often provide sufficient evidence to
convict a defendant, the "evidence supporting identity" in this matter failed to "rise to the
level that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of [the defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 413.
A person commits first degree aggravated burglary "if in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes bodily
injury to any other person who is not a participant in the crime; or (b) uses or threatens
the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not a participant in
the crime; or (c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon." Utah
Code §76-6-203, R.253.
41

In State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, ifiJ44-47, 47 P.3d 115, this Court held that
there was sufficient evident to convict the defendant of aggravated burglary. In Martinez,
two men entered a residence without permission and shot one of the inhabitants. Id. at ,r2.
An eyewitness identified the defendant as the driver of the getaway car. Id. at ,rs. And,
while the defendant was held in jail during the pendency of the case, he confessed to
another inmate that he had participated in the crime. Id. at if9. Defendant argued against
the reliability of the eyewitness identification because the witness "was focused on her
children's safety, her observation lasted only a few seconds, and the presentation of the
photo spread [by the officer] was suggestive." Id. at ,r20. In addition, the defendant
argued that the problems related to the eyewitness identification highlighted the
insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for murder and aggravated robbery
as "there was no reliable or conclusive evidence to support a finding that he acted as a
party to the offense." Id. at iJ42. This Court, however, held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions because the defendant confessed to the
crime to a fellow jail inmate, defendant's car clearly matched the car seen at the crime
scene, and the eyewitness commented on the "unique eyes" of the perpetrator which
matched defendant's eyes. Id. at iJ43. Thus, in Martinez, this Court pointed to additional
reliable evidence other than only the eyewitness identification evidence to deny the
defendant's insufficiency claim.
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The marshaled evidence supporting Mr. Craft's aggravated robbery and aggravated
burglary convictions, in the light most favorable to the verdict, is the following. 8
1. Davis testified that while the three uninvited men were in his house on March 12,
2013, he was able to see that one of the men had "darker skin and [the other]
one ... white." R.397-398,401,416,424. In addition, at one point, the "white one"
removed his mask. R.401,412. Davis was able to see the man without his mask in
his ''peripheral vision" while he was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial
position." R.412-413, 400-01.
2. Torres testified that approximately seven to eight hours after the incident, Davis
met with Torres and was presented with a sequential photo line-up of six photos.
R.434-35,531,544,572. Davis pointed to a photo of Mr. Craft and stated that he
"looked familiar." R.418,545-56. In response, Torres asked Davis if the man in the
photo was the same man that stood next to Davis's bed during the robbery
incident. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546.
3. At the pre-trial interview between Davis and Torres, Davis said that the man who
removed his mask at his house was "male, white with reddish-brown hair and
[had] a goatee." R.544,572.
4. Using a GPS system, police officers were able to track the iPhone taken from
Davis to a trailer park near Harrison Avenue, between Main Street and West
Temple. R.407-08,488,450-51. When police officers arrived at the trailer park, two
men ran in the direction of trailer 14 after seeing the police officers. R.482-83,
488. Mr. Craft was among the seven individuals who were located inside trailer
number 14. R.529-30,555-556,608,613,621. See also State's Exhibits 37-42,
photos depicting the seven individuals found in the trailer. A photo of Mr. Craft is
State's Ex. 41. R. 556.
5. Officers obtained a search warrant to search a silver PT Cruiser that was located
next to trailer 14. R.453,458. In the PT Cruiser, officers found marijuana, a gun
holster, a mask, an I-pad, a flashlight, a set of keys, video games, and a jacket
inside the vehicle. R.453,458-59,461-62,547,612.
j~

6. During the pendency of the case, a phone call was made from the jail and
computer information showed that the phone call came from Mr. Craft. R.534-39.
This phone call was recorded by the jail, and in this phone call a male voice told a
female "I guess my homeboys-my homeboys are a little crazy man. Fucking I
8 See

Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9); State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, mf40-44, 326 P.3d 645.
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told 'em to leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave
it.' R.534-39. See also State's Ex. 23. Torres also testified at trial that during this
same phone call, the female stated, "you messed up, what were you thinking?" to
which the male responded, "I'm probably going to do a nickle." R.538.
7. At trial, Davis pointed to and identified Mr. Craft after the prosecutor asked him if
the white man who took off his mask during the March 2013 incident was in the
courtroom. R.401-02.
Even when looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
prosecution presented insufficient evidence that Mr. Craft was one of the three men in
Davis and Kirby's house on March 12, 2013. In this matter, the prosecution
impermissibly "stack[ed] inference upon inference in its effort to identify [Mr. Craft] as
one of the robbers." Bonner, 735 F.Supp.2d at 410; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT
App 228, iJ7, 238 P.3d 1096. Because the convictions were based only on speculation and
remote possibilities of guilt, the convictions should be overturned. See State v. Shumway,
2002 UT 124, iJ18, 63 P.3d 94.
Like in Bonner, the evidence in this matter failed to show that Mr. Craft was
present at the scene of the robbery. Bonner, 648 F.3d at 210. Mr. Craft was not in
possession of the stolen items and none of Mr. Craft's fingerprints nor DNA evidence
was found on any of the items that were taken from Davis's residence or on any of the
items that were found in the PT Cruiser. R.476,465,548, 551. Cf DeJesus, 712 P.2d at
246 (defendant's palm print and thumb print were found at the scene of the robbery.). In
addition, none of Mr. Craft's personal items were found in the PT Cruiser. R.453-62.
There was simply no evidence to connect Mr. Craft to the PT Cruiser as the vehicle
didn't belong to him but belonged to Desmond Redkettle. R.547. At best, the evidence
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only showed that Mr. Craft was one of seven individuals found in trailer 14 and this
evidence falls extremely short of proving that Mr. Craft was present at the crime scene.
R.529-531; see also Bonner, 648 F.3d at 210.
In closing arguments, the State emphasized that Mr. Craft was the only individual
in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis. R.609-10,621-622. This
statement, however, was incorrect. First, Davis identified the intruder who took of his
face as "male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R. 572. While Mr. Craft had
a goatee, he did not have reddish-brown hair, but had a mostly shaved head with very
little dark hair. See State's Ex. 41. Second, there was another white male found in the
trailer who did have reddish-brown hair. See State's Ex. 42. This person was Dustin
Kil pack. R. 529.
The eyewitness testimony was also not sufficient to place Mr. Craft at the crime
scene. For reasons discussed supra, the eyewitness testimony was unreliable because it
clearly failed to meet the factors outlined in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 780. See also supra,
Part IA. Davis's ability to view the robbers was significantly hindered and the
identifications he made of Mr. Craft were the product of suggestion. See supra, Part IA.
In addition, the credibility of the eyewitness was suspect because Davis not only received
immunity for his testimony which prevented him from facing drug charges, but he also
lied about the marijuana that he had in his house. R.393,409,418. Davis testified that he
had only "an eighth of marijuana" for personal use and denied being involved in drug
distribution, yet a police search of his house uncovered much more than an eighth of an
ounce of marijuana, as well as scales, pipes and bongs-all items "consistent with drug
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distribution." R.393 409,417-418 549-550. Thus, Davis had every reason to pick out Mr.
Craft in order to prevent himself from facing criminal charges.
Unlike in Watson and Martinez, there was no other reliable independent evidence
in addition to the unreliable eyewitness identifications that placed Mr. Craft at the crime
scene. See State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT
App 126. There were no unique clothing articles that tied Mr. Craft to the robbery. See

Watson, at 40 (the unique dark cowboy hat and leather jacket tied the defendant to the
crime scene). Likewise, there were not any unique facial characteristics that tied Mr.
Craft to the Crime Scene. See Martinez, at ,I4 (the eyewitness noted the "unique eyes" of
the perpetrator which matched defendant's eyes).
In addition, unlike the facts in Martinez, there was no independent confession
given by Mr. Craft to the crime. Martinez, at ,I9. The evidence of the phone call made
from the jail did not constitute a confession by Mr. Craft. R.537-39. See also State's Ex.
23. Even in assuming that Mr. Craft was the man talking in the phone call, none of the
ambiguous statements contained in the call support the view that Mr. Craft admitted to
being present at the crime scene. The statement, "I'm probably going to do a nickle"
showed at most that Mr. Craft believed he would likely be incarcerated. R.538. This,
however, is a far cry short of confessing to a crime. That is, believing that jail or prison
time is imminent is, at best, Mr. Craft expressing his concern and anxiety that he may not
prevail at trial. Simply being arrested for the felony charges could lead Mr. Craft to
express his frustration that incarceration was an inevitable outcome. A proper reading of
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this call is that Mr. Craft was reaching out for support because he was facing felony
charges and fearing long-term incarceration. See Bonner, 735 F.Supp.2d at 409, 411-412.
In addition, the statement "I guess my homeboys ... I told 'em to leave all the
electronics, 'don't -don't touch nothing like that" did not place Mr. Craft at the crime
scene. See State's Ex. 23. That is, this ambiguous statement lacks any contextual
information about who, what, when, or why it is being uttered. To infer that this
statement means that Mr. Craft was admitting that on March 12, 2013 he was present at
Davis and Kirby's residence is only based on "speculative possibilities of guilt." State v.
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ifl8; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, if7. Just
because the topic of electronics is being discussed in the jail phone call does not mean
that this discussion is about the electronics taken from Davis and Kirby, and to think
otherwise is an example of extreme speculation. Shumway at ,r18.
The admission of the improper co-defendant hearsay statement was also not
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. That is, this statement was inherently unreliable
because of the self-serving interests of the co-defendants. See infra, Part II.
Ultimately, because there was no reliable eyewitness identification in this matter
and no reliable independent evidence to place Mr. Craft at the crime scene, there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The jury thus took an impermissible
"speculative leap" with the evidentiary gaps to convict Mr. Craft. Shumway, at if 15.
This issue is preserved based upon defense counsel's directed verdict motion.
R.558. But to the extent the Court believes it is not, it should review the issue for plain
error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, if3, 282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging
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the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial
court erred in submitted the case to the jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
ifl7, 10P.3d346).
For reasons mentioned supra, the evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Craft's
convictions. The prosecution presented insufficient that Mr. Craft was one of the three
uninvited men that entered Davis and Kirby's residence on March 12, 2013. See Holgate,
2000 UT 74, ,rt 7. Therefore, the insufficiency of the evidence was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary charges to the jury. Id.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Craft respectfully asks this Court to reverse and
remand with an order of dismissal because the evidence was insufficient. Alternatively,
Mr. Craft asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial because of the improperly
admitted evidence regarding the unreliable eyewitness identifications and the improper
co-defendant hearsay statement.
"0 _ day of March, 2016.
SUBMITTED this ____.._,j_l'I_

TERESA L. WELCH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

48

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, TERESA L. WELCH, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and three copies to the Attorney General 1s
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, t h i s ~ day of March, 2016.

TERESA L. WELCH

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l),]

•

certify that this brief contains 13.250 words, excluding the table of contents, table of
authorities, addenda, and certificates of compliance and delivery. In compliance with the
typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b), I certify that this brief has been prepared
in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft Word 2010 in Times New Roman 13

point.

TERESA L. WELCH

DELNERED this L

day of March, 2016.

49

Tab A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT,
Defendant.
custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Case No: 131902555 FS
Judge:
PAUL B PARKER
August 24, 2015
[)ate:

PRESENT
Clerk:
shantec
Prosecutor: COOLEY, BRADFORD D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BOWN, CHRISTOPHER G
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 11, 1990
Sheriff Officel: 311469
Audio
Tape Number:
Tape Count: 10.52
S34-10.41
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
- Disposition: 06/17/2015 Guilty
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
- Disposition: 06/17/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

Printed: 08/24/15 10:56:00

Pagel of 2

Case No: 131902555 Date:

Aug 24, 2015

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run concurrent.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
JUSTIN CRAFT
LOUIE

Restitution
Amount: $2250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: KIRBY
Restitution
Amount: $2000.00
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Defendant has a right to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing.
CUSTODY

Printed: 08/24/15 10:56:00
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Tab B

§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary, UT ST§ 76-6-203

Q

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203
§ 76-6-203.

Aggravated burglary

(I) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a
burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:

(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not
a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section
76-1-601.

O

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § l; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6.

Notes of Decisions (54)

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203, UT ST§ 76-6-203
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Dorumenl
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§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 (2012)
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery

(l) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6-1-60 I;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

~

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c.
271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, cff. May 5, 2003.
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~

U.S. Const. amend VI

Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
infonned of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

